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Abstract—We present a practical and provably-secure multi-
node communication scheme in the presence of a passive eaves-
dropper. The scheme is based on a random scheduling approach
that hides the identity of the transmitter from the eavesdropper.
This random scheduling leads to ambiguity at the eavesdropper
with regard to the origin of the transmitted frame. We present
the details of the technique and analyze it to quantify the secrecy-
fairness-overhead trade-off. Implementation of the scheme over
Crossbow Telosb motes, equipped with CC2420 radio chips,
shows that the scheme can achieve significant secrecy gain
with vanishing outage probability. In addition, it has significant
overhead advantage over direct extensions to two-nodes schemes.
The technique also has the advantage of allowing inactive nodes
to leverage sleep mode to further save energy.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the continuous growth of wireless networks and
emerging new technologies such as WiMAX and LTE, wireless
networks security has received extensive attention. Current
popular security schemes, e.g. public key cryptography, are
based on computationally secure trapdoor one-way functions
[1]. These schemes depend on the assumption that it is hard
for an attacker to decipher the message without knowing the
trapdoor (i.e. the secret key). However, these schemes do not
prevent a computationally unlimited attacker from decrypting
the message without knowing the trapdoor as it is not proven
yet that one-way functions cannot be inverted efficiently [1].
Therefore, these schemes are not provably secure.
Information theoretic secrecy, on the other hand, introduces
the possibility of having perfectly secure communication inde-
pendently from the computational capabilities of the attacker
[2]–[15]. In particular, Shannon [2] proved that, using a shared
secret key K , the achievability of perfect secrecy requires
that the entropy of K be at least equal to the entropy of the
message M (i.e., H(K) ≥ H(M)). Wyner showed that it is
possible to send perfectly secure messages at a non-zero rate,
without relying on secret keys or any limiting assumptions on
the computational power of the wiretapper, under the condition
that the source-wiretapper channel is a degraded version of the
source-destination channel [3]. This was later extended to the
non-degraded scenario in [4]. In [5], [6], the effect of fading
on the secrecy capacity was studied and it was shown that
distributing the message across different fading realizations
actually increases the secrecy capacity.
Although information theoretic security schemes provide
provable security, they have been considered not practical
due to the simplifying assumptions they have to prove their
security. Recently, we have introduced a number of practical
and provably-secure protocols for two-node communication
based on information theoretic concepts. Our work in [7]–
[10] exploits the multi-path nature of the wireless medium to
provide practical information-theoretic security in channels
with feedback. The basic idea is to distribute the secret key
among multiple ARQ frames. This concept has been used to
enhance the security of practical Wi-Fi and RFID protocols at
the expense of slight loss in throughput.
Direct extensions of these two-node schemes to the multi-
node case, by applying the protocol to each pair of communi-
cating nodes, lead to a considerable waste of throughput. This
is due to optimizing each pair independently, extending the
two-node overhead to the multi-node case.
In this paper, we present a practical and provably-secure
scheme at the presence of a passive eavesdropper that is
designed for the multi-node case from the beginning. Our
scheme is based on a novel two-phase approach: in the first
phase, i.e. the selection phase, a node is selected as the
transmitter using information theoretic techniques that hide
the identity of the selected node. In the second phase, i.e. the
data transmission phase, data frames are transmitted without
the source/destination ID in the packet header. This leads
to ambiguity at the eavesdropper. The length of the data
transmission phase can be tuned to trade-off secrecy and
efficiency. Nodes not selected at the selection phase can sleep
to the next cycle, further reducing their energy consumption.
We present different variations of the basic scheme, all having
the same overhead, that can achieve different secrecy-fairness
trade-offs. We evaluate our proposed schemes both analytically
and through implementation over Crossbow Telosb motes,
equipped with CC2420 radio chips. Our evaluation shows
that the scheme can achieve both significant secrecy gain and
decrease in overhead as compared to direct extensions to the
two-node schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We define
the system model in Section II. Section III presents the basic
scheme. In Section IV, we present four different extensions
to the basic scheme that can achieve different secrecy-fairness
trade-offs. We analyze the proposed schemes in Section V
along with the system implementation. We finally conclude
Par. Meaning Default val.
n Number of network nodes. 8
f Num. of packets transm. in a single session. 4
l Frame length. 1024
k Num. of frames needed to reconstruct orig. message. 32
t preamble length 6
TABLE I
SYMBOLS USED IN THE PAPER.
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Fig. 1. Network model. A star topology is assumed where each node have
to send/receive through the coordinator (CO). In the selection phase, a node
is selected if it receives a 1 bit from the CO using dialog codes(N2 in this
example).
the paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a network with n legitimate nodes in the
presence of a passive eavesdropper (Eve). We assume a star
topology, where all the traffic between nodes has to go through
a central node, i.e. a coordinator. This is common in WLANs,
cellular, and sensor networks1. This coordinator (e.g. access
point, base station, or gateway) is responsible for controlling
the transmission in the network and assigning turns. All nodes
are equipped with half-duplex antennas. We further assume
a time-slotted communication system, where all nodes are
synchronized (Figure 1).
For space constraints, we also assume that all nodes have
equal load and Eve cannot differentiate between nodes based
on power2. We leave the general case to a future paper.
To further remove the need of acknowledgment, each mes-
sage M is erasure-coded into m frames such that the reception
of any k < m frames at the receiver can be used to reconstitute
M with high probability. Note that using erasure coding does
not give any advantage to Eve as (a) she cannot determine the
identity of the transmitter and (b) there is no message level
error detection (only CRC at the frame level).
All system parameters are assumed to be known to the
eavesdropper along with the details of the technique, but not
the instantaneous random values.
Each node needs to send and receive k frames, each of l
bits. Table I summarizes the different symbols we use in the
paper.
1Note that a coordinator can also be selected in a distributed manner if no
central node is available.
2Power randomization can be used in this case to confuse Eve as in our
previous work for two nodes [11].
III. BASIC SCHEME
The basic idea of our approach is to hide the identity of the
packet receiver at any point in time from the eavesdropper.
This creates an ambiguity that gives advantage to legitimate
nodes. In particular, the system works in two phases: a receiver
selection phase and a data transmission phase. In the first
phase, the coordinator (CO) informs one of the n nodes
securely, using physical layer security principles, that it is
selected as the receiver for the packets in the second phase. In
the data transmission phase, only the intended receiver has to
be active, all other nodes can go to sleep mode, reducing the
energy consumption of other nodes. An eavesdropper receiving
a packet cannot determine the destination of the packet, and
hence has to guess.
The selection phase can be repeated as frequently as needed,
by reducing the number of frames during the data transmission
phase (f ), to increase security. However, this increases the
system overhead. Therefore, we have a tradeoff between
secrecy and overhead.
In the rest of this section, we present the details of the
two phases, assuming one way communication from the
coordinator to the nodes. We present the two-way case in
Section IV and analyze the overhead and security of the system
in Section V.
A. Receiver Selection Phase
During this phase, the coordinator (CO) selects one of the
n nodes to be active during the data transmission phase. This
is achieved by sending a one bit from the coordinator to each
node indicating whether this node is selected (bit= 1) or not
(bit= 0). We adopt dialog codes [12] as the provably secure
technique for exchanging these bits. In perfect conditions,
dialog codes encode each bit as two bits and the receiver jams
only one of these two bits randomly. Under a binary modulo-2
additive channel model, Eve has to guess which bit has been
jammed, while Bob knows the correct bit with no ambiguity.
To accommodate realistic situations, [12] adds a t − 1 bit
randomly chosen preamble to the source bit and then encodes
the result by dialog codes. The probability of Eve correctly
guessing the transmitted bit (PE) then becomes:
PE =
1
2
(
1 + (1− w)
t+1
2
)
, w = min(p, q) (1)
where p and q are the probability of corrupting 0 to 1 and
1 to 0 respectively.
Equation 1 shows that PE converges to 12 as t increases.
[12] showed that, in practice, the convergence speed is much
faster than 1
2
(
1 + (1− w)
t+1
2
)
. In addition, they showed that
for a typical environment, a 6 to 8 bit preamble is enough
to confuse Eve. This has been confirmed in our experiment.
B. Data Transmission Phase
During this phase, the selected node can send/receive f
data frames, where f is a parameter that can be used to tune
security versus overhead. Only the selected node needs to
be active. Transmitted frames do not contain the ID of the
receiver, which leads to ambiguity at the eavesdropper about
the origin of the frames.
IV. TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION
To allow for two-way communication, we need to specify
which slots within a session in the data transmission phase will
be from/to the coordinator. In order to do that, we add a third
short direction determination phase between the selection and
data transmission phases in which the CO sends f bits, using
dialog codes again, where each bit corresponds to a slot in the
data transmission session. A bit set to 1 (0) corresponds to a
from (to) CO slot. Note that the node ID is not sent in this
phase. Therefore, Eve cannot know the identity of the selected
node.
In the data transmission phase, a node will follow the
schedule received during the direction selection phase.
In the rest of this section, we present four different schemes
for assigning the schedule between the different nodes and
from/to the coordinator. The different schemes can achieve
different fairness-security goals as we quantify in Section V.
Fairness refers to balancing the access opportunity within
nodes and between the from/to coordinator traffic. Therefore,
we have four combinations of fairness: node fairness (short and
long term) and direction fairness (short and long term). In all
schemes, all nodes have to finish one message of transmission
before any node can start a new message for fairness purposes.
Table II compares the different schemes.
We start by some notations followed by the details of the
four schemes.
A. Notations
The following notations are illustrated in Figure 2.
• A session is a group of slots that represent a single
selection phase followed by a data transmission phase.
The data phase of each session contains f frames.
• A round is defined as a group of n sessions, in which
each one of the n nodes is assigned one session.
• A supersession is a group of sessions (2nk) in which
all nodes finish the transmission of one message (i.e. a
transmission of k frames in each direction from/to the
coordinator).
• A node supersession is a group of k sessions that belong
to one node in which this node finishes the transmission
of one message.
B. Fair node selection and fair direction division scheme (FN-
FD)
This scheme combines short term node fairness and short
term direction fairness (Figure 2(a)). In particular, all nodes
must take a turn within the round (in a random fashion) before
a node can be assigned another turn by the coordinator. The
number of from/to slots within each data transmission session
are equal. Therefore, both node and direction distributions
have short term fairness. This scheme, however, reduces the
ambiguity at the eavesdropper and hence decreases security as
we quantify in the next section.
C. Random node selection and fair direction division scheme
(RN-FD)
In this scheme (Figure 2(b)), the number of from/to frames
within each data session has to be equal (achieving direction
fairness). However, the sessions assigned to a specific node can
be anywhere within the supersession (random node selection),
i.e. there are no rounds.
D. Fair node selection and random direction division scheme
(FN-RD)
In this scheme (Figure 2(c)), each node has to be selected
at least once before another node gets a second chance. In
other words, each node will take a turn within the round.
The direction of traffic from/to the coordinator needn’t be
balanced within a session, but is balanced on the long term in
the supersession.
The send/receive queue at the coordinator though may not
be balanced due to the random direction assignment. The
constraints of the long term fairness over the direction of traffic
increases the amount of state that needs to be kept at the
coordinator.
E. Random node selection and random direction division
scheme (RN-RD)
In this last scheme, the coordinator divides the sessions
among the nodes and the from/to traffic randomly within the
supersession. Therefore, both node and direction distributions
do not have short term fairness (Figure 2(d)).
This scheme has the advantage of increasing the ambiguity
at the eavesdropper and hence increasing security. However, it
lacks short term fairness and the coordinator has to keep track
of more state for the long term fairness.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the different schemes through
analysis and simulation in terms of security, overhead, and
fairness.
A. Secrecy
For security, we have two modes, depending on the eaves-
dropper goal. In the first mode, (single node) the eavesdropper
is only interested in the messages of a specific node. The
second mode assumes that the eavesdropper is interested in
the entire network traffic.
1) Single node attack: Let the selected node for the attack
be s. We analyze the security of the four different schemes.
Note that the total number of slots for all nodes to transmit
one message in each direction each is 2nk. The corresponding
total number of sessions therefore is 2nk
f
and the number of
sessions allocated to a single node is 2k
f
.
a) RN-FD scheme: In order for Eve to guess the mes-
sage of s, it needs to guess the sessions assigned to s. This
occurs with probability
=
1( 2nk
f
2k
f
) (2)
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT SCHEDULING SCHEMES.
Scheme Abbrev. Node selection
fairness
From/To coordi-
nator (direction)
fairness
One node outage
prob. (PrOut(n))
Network
outage prob.
(PrNOut(n))
Overhead
Random node selection
and random direction divi-
sion
RN-RD Long term Long term 1( 2nk
f
2k
f
)
1(
2k
k
)
∏1
i=n Prout(i)
t(n+f)
fl+t(n+f)
Random node selection
and fair direction division
RN-FD Long term Short term 1( 2nk
f
2k
f
)
1
(
f
f
2
) 2k
f
Fair node selection and
random direction division
FN-RD Short term Long term
(
1
n
) 2k
f 1(
2k
k
)
Random within round
node selection and fair
direction division
FN-FD Short term Short term 1( 2nk
f
2k
f
)
1(
2k
k
)
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(a) Fair node selection and fair direction
division (FN-FD).
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(b) Random node selection and fair
direction division (RN-FD).
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(c) Fair node selection and random direc-
tion division (FN-RD).
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(d) Random node selection and ran-
dom direction division (RN-RD).
Fig. 2. Four different schemes for two-way communication. The direction selection phase between the selection and data transmission phase is not shown
for clarity. Different colors represent different nodes while different hashing pattern represent the from/to slots.
In addition, Eve has to guess the direction of the frames to
avoid mixing the packets from/to the coordinator. This occurs
with probability:
=
1(f
f
2
) 2k
f
(3)
Therefore, the outage probability for this scheme, for an
n-node network (Prout(n)) is:
Prout(n) =
1( 2nk
f
2k
f
) 1(f
f
2
) 2k
f
(4)
b) FN-RD scheme: In this case, Eve needs to decide
in each round which session belongs to s. Therefore the
probability of correctly guessing Eve’s sessions in the entire
supersession is:
=
(
1
n
) 2k
f
(5)
Once the sessions of node s are determined, Eve has to
guess which of the total of 2k frames are to the coordinator
and which are from it. This occurs with probability:
=
1(
2k
k
) (6)
Therefore, the outage probability is this case is
Prout(n) =
(
1
n
) 2k
f 1(
2k
k
) (7)
c) RN-RD scheme: Similar to equations 2 and 6, the
outage probability in this case is:
Prout(n) =
1( 2nk
f
2k
f
) 1(2k
k
) (8)
d) FN-FD scheme: Similarly, the outage probability
here can be obtained by combining equations 3 and 5 as:
Prout(n) =
(
1
n
) 2k
f 1(f
f
2
) 2k
f
(9)
2) Network-wide attack: In this attack, Eve is interested
in obtaining the entire network traffic. Once Eve guesses the
frames of one node, the problem size decreases to that of an
n− 1 node network. Therefore, the outage probability in this
case (PrNOut) is:
PrNOut =
1∏
i=n
Prout(i) (10)
B. Overhead
The four different schemes have the same overhead which
is due to the selection and direction determination phases.
Therefore, the overhead for all four schemes is:
t(n+ f)
fl + t(n+ f)
(11)
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0  10  20  30  40  50
O
ve
rh
ea
d
Number of nodes (n)
f=1
f=4
f=16
Fig. 4. Effect of different parameters on overhead (l = 1024 bits, t = 6).
Note that a longer frame length (l) leads to lower overhead.
which is a function of the number of nodes (n), dialog codes
preamble length (t), number of slots in a session (f ), and the
data frame length (l).
C. Numerical Results
1) Secrecy analysis: Figure 3 shows the effect of chang-
ing the system parameters, i.e. n, k, and f , on the outage
probability for the four schemes. The figure shows that all
schemes have the advantage of enhancing the secrecy with the
increase of the number of nodes in the network. Increasing k
increases the space of guessing at Eve, and hence enhances
secrecy. Increasing f leads to increasing the length of the data
transmission phase and hence reducing the frequency of the
selection phase. This reduces secrecy.
The figure also shows that the RN-RD scheme has the
highest secrecy. This is due to the increased ambiguity at Eve
due to the randomization of both node selection and direction.
On the other extreme, the FN-FD scheme has the least secrecy.
The other two schemes have a secrecy outage probability
in between: As the data phase length increases, direction
randomization leads to more secrecy than node randomization.
2) Overhead: Figure 4 shows the effect of changing the
system parameters on the system overhead. The figure shows
that the overhead increases with the increase of the number of
nodes in the network and the decrease of the data transmission
phase length. Therefore, a trade-off exists between overhead
and secrecy. The operation point can be selected based on the
specific application need.
3) Fairness: For the fairness in node selection, we use the
variance of the difference between two consecutive sessions
indices as our metric. The more consistent this difference, the
lower the variance, and the higher the fairness. More formally,
if the session indices assigned to a node are {si‖0 < i <
2k/f}, then di = si+1 − si and the unfairness index equals
Var(di). Figure 5 shows the effect of the different parameters
on node fairness. The figure confirms that the round-based
schemes are fairer than the random schemes. As the number
of nodes (n) increases, the unfairness increases. On the other
hand, for a fixed n = 8, increasing the number of sessions,
by either increasing k or reducing f , the unfairness increases.
However, this is limited to within a round in the short term
node fairness (FN) schemes and is more variable in the long
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Fig. 6. Effect of different parameters on direction fairness.
term node fairness schemes. The saturation in both cases is
due to the limitation imposed by the supersession size.
For direction fairness, our metric is the absolute difference
between the sum of the send and receive indices within
a specific node supersession, averaged over all nodes. The
smaller this number, the higher the fairness. Note that since
the fairness metric is node based, it is independent from the
number of nodes n.
Figure 6 shows the effect of the different parameters on
direction fairness. The figure confirms that the short term
direction fairness (FD) schemes are fairer than the long term
direction fairness (RD) schemes. As the number of frames
required to construct a mesage (k) increases, the unfairness
increases in the long term direction fairness scheme as the
overall number of slots in the node supersession will increase.
k has no effect on the short term direction fairness schemes
as all direction selections are based on a round, which is
independent of k. This is the opposite case as we fix k and
change the number of frames within a session (f ). In this case,
the performance of the completely random case is independent
of the number of frames within a session, as all sessions
are concatenated in one supersession. Increasing f increases
the unfairness of the short term direction fairness schemes.
However, their worst case performance is bounded by the
performance of the long term direction fairness scheme, where
on session becomes a node supersession.
4) Comparison with a traditional two-node system: Fig-
ure 7 compares the proposed schemes to the practical prov-
ably secure two-node scheme proposed in [11] under typical
parameters for all schemes. The scheme in [11] is based on
randomization between two nodes. A direct extension for this
case to the multi-node case is to apply it pairwise to each
transmitter receiver. The figure shows that this reduces secrecy
significantly, with several orders of magnitude and this loss in
secrecy increases with the increase in the number of nodes.
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Fig. 7. Comparison with previous two-node based practical provably secure
schemes [11].
Since [11] does not leverage the multi-node in its design, both
its security and overhead is independent of n. Our proposed
schemes also have much better overhead under typical network
sizes.
D. System Implementation
We have also implemented the proposed scheme on TelosB
motes equipped with CC2420 radio chips which come with
half-duplex antennas. The motes run the TinyOS operating
system.
The network consists of three types of nodes nodes:
1) An observer node, which plays a double role in our
setup. First, it plays the role of the passive eavesdropper
which sniffs all sent frames. Second, it is responsible
for synchronizing all nodes in the network by sending
a pulse (synchronization frame in our case) at constant
intervals to initiate the start of a slot and hence trans-
mission of frames. The remaining nodes react to these
synchronization frames.
2) A normal node (representing one of the n legitimate
nodes).
3) A coordinator node, which selects which node to trans-
mit and the direction of traffic.
The implementation results confirm the analysis results in
the previous sections. More details about the implementation
can be found in [15].
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a novel practical and provably secure solu-
tion to the multi-node wireless communication problem. Our
solution is based on hiding the identity of the communicating
nodes from the eavesdropper. We presented four different vari-
ations of the basic scheme that can achieve different fairness-
security tradeoffs. We evaluated the proposed techniques using
analysis and implementation. Our results show that our scheme
outperforms direct extensions of the two-node communication
schemes in terms of both overhead and secrecy, highlighting
its suitability for highly secure applications.
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